经济学人双语版-会总要开 Some body to hold

  • 经济学人双语版-会总要开 Some body to hold已关闭评论
  • A+

FlyTitle: The Hua-war

The fight with Huawei has diminished America’s ability to shape tech rules

与华为的较量削弱了美国制定技术规则的能力

经济学人双语版-会总要开 Some body to hold

THE PROCESS of setting standards attracts little attention, probably because it is very boring. Its magi gather regularly to seek consensus on mind-numbing technical details for the running of things like cell phone networks, artificial intelligence services and global shipping. Meetings are arranged through bodies with names like ISO (International Organisation for Standardisation) or 5GAA (the 5G Automotive Association, a specialist body focused on building 5G connectivity into autonomous cars). There are hundreds of these things.

制定标准的过程少有人关注,可能是因为它相当无趣。“贤士”们定期碰头,寻求就运行手机网络、人工智能服务和全球航运等事务的枯燥乏味的技术细节达成共识。这类会议由各种机构举办,它们带有一串字母组成的名字,如ISO(国际标准化组织)或5GAA(5G汽车协会,一个专门为无人驾驶汽车建构5G连接的组织)。这样的团体成百上千。

Standards are important, despite appearances. The internet protocol, written by Vint Cerf and Bob Kahn in California in 1973, is the fundamental standard on which the rest of the internet runs. Mr Cerf now works for Google, and America holds significant sway over the net. Those who set the rules for a piece of technical infrastructure, such as the internet, gain power over its future workings. This is why America worries about China’s growing contributions to standards for 5G networks and other technologies. Yet for the past year technology companies with operations in America have been frozen out of some standard-setting as an accidental consequence of the American government’s attack on the Chinese tech giant, Huawei.

标准很重要,尽管表面上看不出来。温特·瑟夫(Vint Cerf)和鲍勃·卡恩(Bob Kahn)于1973年在加州撰写的互联网协议是互联网其余部分赖以运行的基本标准。瑟夫现在为谷歌工作,而美国对互联网拥有强大的支配力。那些为技术基础设施的某一个部分(如互联网)制定规则的人会获得对其未来运作的影响力。这就是为什么美国会担心中国在5G网络和其他技术的标准投入日益增多。然而,美国政府对中国科技巨头华为的进攻产生了一个意外后果:过去一年,有美国业务的科技公司被排除在一些标准的制定议程之外。

This started with the addition of Huawei to the entity list in May 2019. That made it illegal for any company to export products to Huawei that had been made in America. Tech-company lawyers looked at the regulations and decided that the law prohibited interaction with Huawei during the course of standard-setting, too. They worried that, in the course of discussion, American-made technologies would in effect be transferred to Huawei, placing their employer in breach of the rules.

这始于2019年5月华为被列入“实体清单”,之后任何公司向华为出口美国制造的产品都属非法。科技公司的律师研究了相关规定后,认为法律也禁止了在标准制定过程中与华为互动。他们担心,在协商过程中美国发明的技术实际上会转移到华为那里,而使自己的公司违反出口禁令。

That legal decision created a problem. Huawei plays a big role in setting standards on artificial intelligence, 5G and other connectivity technologies, so avoiding interactions with the firm while simultaneously getting involved in the rigorous nerdery of standard-setting was impossible. As a result, some companies with American operations have removed themselves from the standard-setting processes in which they used to join. In areas where Huawei is active, this has left America voiceless in setting the tech rules of the future.

这个法律决策制造了一个问题。华为在制定人工智能、5G和其他连接技术的标准方面扮演重要角色,因此既要避免与这家公司互动,同时又要参与到严谨的标准制定中是不可能的。其结果就是,一些有美国业务的公司主动离开了过去参与过的标准制定流程。在华为活跃的领域,这已经让美国在制定未来的技术规则方面集体失声。

The effect has been particularly acute at standards bodies that convene outside America, where the organisers are less inclined to make arrangements to accommodate firms that are subject to export-control rules. At those meetings, in some instances, Huawei and other Chinese companies have had a voice where American companies have not. Some, such as 3GPP, a body that deals with 5G, and IEEE, an engineering body, have declared themselves to be “open” meetings, in an attempt to remove liability from firms with American operations. But uncertainty persists.

在那些在美国境外召开会议的标准制定机构中,这种影响尤为突显,因为会议主办方更不愿意做出安排,去邀请那些受到出口禁令约束的公司。有些时候,在这些会议上华为和其他中国公司拥有发言权,而美国公司没有。一些机构,比如处理5G事宜的第三代伙伴计划协议(3GPP)和工程行业的电气和电子工程师协会(IEEE),已经宣布自己是“公开”会议,试图让有美国业务的公司免于担上责任。但不确定性依然存在。

Standards bodies with American operations, such as the Wi-Fi Alliance in Austin, Texas, or the Bluetooth Special Interest Group in Kirkland, Washington, have faced their own version of the problem. Some have excluded Huawei. While this does mean that American companies can take part in Huawei-free discussions, it threatens to undermine the standards bodies’ legitimacy as the single forum for the issues they cover. There is talk of competing bodies being set up outside America, to make truly global discussion possible.

有美国业务的标准制定机构,比如得州奥斯汀的Wi-Fi联盟(Wi-Fi Alliance)或华盛顿州柯克兰的蓝牙技术联盟(Bluetooth Special Interest Group),也面临自己的问题。一些已经把华为拒之门外。虽然这确实意味着美国公司可以参加华为缺席的协商了,它却有可能破坏这些机构充当相关议题的唯一论坛的合法性。有传言称,在美国之外的地方正在创建一些竞争性机构,以使真正的全球协商成为可能。

American lawmakers have noticed. On April 14th a group of Republican senators wrote to the Departments of Commerce, Defence, Energy and State fretting that American companies had been locked out of standards discussions on 5G and urging the departments to fix it. The senators said they were “deeply concerned” about the loss of soft power America derives from standard-setting by American companies.

美国的立法者已经注意到了这个问题。4月14日,一批共和党参议员致信美国商务部、国防部、能源部和国务院,表达对美国公司被排除在5G标准商议之外的忧虑,敦促这些部门纠正问题。这些参议员表示,他们“深切关注”美国丧失从由美国企业制定标准中获得的软实力。

Few in Washington disagree, yet the fix is not straightforward. Tweaking rules in favour of engagement with Huawei is politically unpalatable, even when that engagement is in forums as innocuous and dull as standards bodies. Meanwhile, Huawei is still building 5G networks around the world, networks which will carry the whizzy internet services of the future. And for almost a year, by its own hand, America’s best companies have been frozen out of discussions which define that future.■

在华盛顿没有谁会不认同这一点,但要解决问题并不简单。调整法规转而支持与华为接触在政治上不讨喜,即便这种接触只是发生在标准制定机构这种无害又沉闷的论坛中。与此同时,华为仍在全球各地建设5G网络,这些网络将承载未来的先进的互联网服务。而近一年来,美国自己动手,把它最好的企业锁在了界定这一未来的讨论之外。

  • 我的微信
  • 这是我的微信扫一扫
  • weinxin
  • 我的微信公众号
  • 我的微信公众号扫一扫
  • weinxin